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HIDING BEHIND THE WALL: FRIEDMAN V. BOARD
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Few topics produce greater controversy than the subject of separa-
tion of church and state. At times the reasoning that can be gleaned
from establishment clause analysis serves to belie Justice Clark's obser-
vation that "[t]here is no war between the Constitution and the common
sense."' This is due in part to the sheer diversity of cases that demand
establishment clause treatment. 2 Even so, for the past fifteen years, the
Supreme Court has proposed and subsequently discarded a number of
guidelines in a vain attempt to articulate principled limits to state in-
volvement with religion.3 As a result of the Court's sacrifice of clarity
and predictability for flexibility,4 lower courts have been left with little
choice but to improvise their own measures of acceptable state action.
Against this background, it is not surprising that the Tenth Circuit
in Friedman v. Board of County Commissioners5 decided that prominent dis-
play of a Christian cross on a county seal violates the principle of gov-
ernmental neutrality required by the establishment clause. Yet, in order
to reach this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit engaged in reasoning that
has aptly been described as concocting "ingenious rationalizations to
deny the obvious."'6 By declining to hear the case, the Supreme Court
squandered an opportunity to clarify the implicit inconsistencies of
Friedman, and thereby further muddied the establishment clause waters.
This comment will describe three theories that have sought to de-
fine the perimeters of state endorsement of religion, and will outline the
progression of cases concerning government display of religious sym-
bols. It will discuss Friedman and the panel decision that it overruled. It
will emphasize the valuable insights and logical shortcomings that Fried-
man offers to establishment clause analysis, and will suggest a method by
which to measure future cases of public display of religious symbols.
II. BACKGROUND
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides
1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
2. See Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall of Sepa-
ration or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 6-8 (1984) (cataloguing conflicting cases).
3. Although the Supreme Court continues to utilize the three-prong test set forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), no clear standards have emerged to assist in the
application of the Lemon test. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 14-19 (Court's changing posi-
tion due in part to inadequacy of establishment clause analysis); Smith, Some Observations on
the Establishment Clause, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 457, 465-69 (1984).
4. Committee For Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
5. 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2890 (1986).
6. Cornelius, supra note 2, at 16.
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that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' 7 This command has two
components: the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.
8
The general aim of both clauses is to protect the individual's right to
religious liberty from infringement by the state.9
The legislative intent of the framers of the establishment clause
continues to be a subject of debate.10 Certainly the clause was designed
to prohibit the federal government from creating the equivalent of the
Church of England in the United States, or from favoring one religious
sect to the exclusion of others. 1 ' What is not as clear is the extent of
state involvement that the establishment clause permits. Three theories
of permissible government conduct have arisen to address that issue.
A. Three Theories of Permissible Government Conduct
1. Separation
The first school of thought advocates the theory of separation. 12
This theory is based upon a metaphor that Thomas Jefferson included in
a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, asserting that the religion
clauses created a "wall of separation between church and state.' 3 The
Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education 14 resurrected the meta-
phor from obscurity and gave it a manifesto-like interpretation.' 5 The
Court's most adamant separationist, Justice Wiley Rutledge, maintained
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. The establishment clause is applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8. The establishment clause and free exercise clause were intended to be "mutually
supportive," yet each works separately to protect distinct liberties. The free exercise
clause seeks to prevent government from acting in a way that intrudes upon the individ-
ual's right to exercise religious beliefs. On the other hand, the establishment clause is
meant to restrain the government from passing laws favoring a particular religion, thereby
placing indirect pressure upon citizens to adopt a particular belief as their own. See L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrrrtrrloNAL LAw § 14-2 (1978).
9. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 673, 677 (1980); Note, Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State. Public
Sponsorship of Religious Displays Under the Federal and California Constitutions, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
499, 502 (1986).
10. Both accommodationists and separationists point to the actions of the founding
fathers to justify their respective positions. See generally R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982) (historical analysis supports
conclusion that equal aid to all religions does not violate establishment clause); A. STOKES
& L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (1964) (founding fathers be-
lieved that church and state should remain completely separate).
11. See Bird, Freedom from Establishment and Unneutrality in Public School Instruction and
Religious School Regulation, 2 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 127-28 (1979).
12. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 11-12; Jones, Accommodationist and Separationist Ideals
in Supreme Court Establishment Clause Decisions, 28J. CHURCH & ST. 193, 194-95 (1986).
13. T. JEFFERSON, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 519 (S. Padover ed. 1943). See generally
Comment,Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of the Man and the Meta-
phor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645 (1978) (exhaustive treatment of "wall of separation"
metaphor).
14. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
15. See Note, Rebuilding the Wall The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1473-77 (1981). Everson underscores the
schizophrenic nature of establishment clause analysis. Even though the Court announced
its refusal to tolerate any government aid to religion, the New Jersey statute authorizing
[Vol. 64:1
HIDING BEHIND THE WALL
that the purpose of the clause "was to create a complete and permanent
separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by com-
prehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for reli-
gion."' 16 Yet even he recognized that absolute separation, while
theoretically attainable, remained a practical impossibility.' 7 Under this
approach, government may not endorse religion or nonreligion in any
way, and the only kind of financial support that the state may provide for
religious institutions is the type of aid to which all citizens are entitled.18
The most likely advocates of separationism on the Court today are Jus-
tices Brennan, l9 Marshall 20 and Stevens.21
2. Accommodation
An alternative to separationism is the theory of accommodation.
22
Its proponents begin with the assumption that the establishment clause
was designed solely to prevent the federal government from designating
a national church or from declaring illegal one of the many state reli-
gions that were then in existence. 23 Since the evils that it was designed
to prevent have disappeared, the establishment clause should be inter-
preted narrowly. Consequently, accommodationists maintain that the
purpose of the establishment clause is "to state an objective, not to write
a statute.' '24 In addition, the history of American government abounds
with examples of toleration that border on outright endorsement of reli-
gion. 25 For these reasons, accommodationists advocate the idea that the
state is free to cooperate with religions in a nondiscriminatory fashion,
even if this cooperation takes the form of financial aid. 26 Chief Justice
Burger leaves the bench as one of America's strongest advocates of the
accommodation theory. On the remainder of the Court, newly con-
firmed Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor have
indicated accommodationist leanings.
2 7
reimbursement to parents of parochial school children for the cost of school busing was
upheld.
16. Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 60-61 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see Jones, supra note 12, at 202-04.
18. See Jones, supra note 12, at 194; Note, supra note 15, at 1483-84.
19. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. Jones, supra note 12, at 199.
21. Committee for Pub. Ed. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
22. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 13-14; Jones, supra note 12, at 195-98.
23. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 (quoting 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 728 (1833)); R. CORD, supra note 10, at 213-214. At the time the
Bill of Rights was ratified, three states had established the Congregational church as their
official religion. Disestablishment occurred in Connecticut in 1818, in New Hampshire in
1819, and in Massachusetts in 1833. Id. at 4; see also H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE
COURT 223 (4th ed. 1982) (recounting history of state religion).
24. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
25. For a nonexhaustive list, see Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-82.
26. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 14.
27. See Jones, supra note 12, at 199.
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3. Strict Neutrality
Between the extremes of the separation theory and the accommoda-
tion theory lies the theory of strict neutrality. 28 This theory is derived
from the implicit tension between the religion clauses. In order to avoid
offending either the free exercise or the establishment clause, strict neu-
trality requires state action to be motivated solely by secular considera-
tions, and prohibits state action that has the effect of either benefiting or
burdening religion. The state must be "religion blind."'2 9 Contempo-
rary Supreme Court analysis tends to resemble most closely the princi-
ple of strict neutrality. As Justice White observed, "our decisions have
tended to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches" in
favor of a flexible model aimed at assuring constitutional neutrality.
3 0
B. The Lemon Test
The analytical paradigm for constitutional scrutiny of establishment
clause cases is embodied in Lemon v. Kurtzman.3 1 There the Court ex-
amined state legislation designed to supplement the salaries of parochial
schoolteachers who taught certain secular subjects. The Court outlined
a three-part test for measuring suspect government conduct. In order
to pass constitutional muster, state action must have a valid secular pur-
pose, have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and must avoid fostering an excessive entanglement between govern-
ment and religion. 3 2 The Court held that the statutes failed to meet the
third prong of the Lemon test by entangling the state in a political dispute
28. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 12-13.
29. See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6, 96
(1961); see also Bird, supra note 11, at 138-42.
30. Committee for Pub. Ed. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
32. Id. at 612-13. What has become known as the Lemon test is really an amalgamation
of the holdings of three cases. The requirement that state action be motivated by a valid
secular purpose was first articulated in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
In that case, the Court upheld a mandatory Sunday Closing law, finding that the state was
acting to further the nonreligous goal of assuring a uniform day of rest. In Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), the Court added the requirement that
the effect of state action must neither advance nor inhibit religion. The Court held that a
Pennsylvania statute requiring daily Bible readings in public schools had the effect of ad-
vancing religion, and therefore violated the establishment clause. Finally, the rule that
otherwise permissible state action will be invalidated if it fosters excessive entanglement
between government and religion was incorporated into establishment clause analysis in
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970). There the Court granted tax-exempt
status to religious institutions. The Court justified its decision by finding that denial of the
exemption would entangle the government in the affairs of religion more than the grant-
ing of the exemption. This requirement that state action not foster entanglement has two
components: administrative entanglement and political entanglement. The former com-
ponent is present when government is required to supervise religion in order to ensure
compliance with a particular statute. This was the case in Walz. The latter component is
present when governmental regulation creates a backlash from the religious community
that polarizes the community according to individual sectarian preference. See Committee
for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). For convenience,
the three requirements or "prongs" of the Lemon test are called the purpose prong, the
effect prong and the entanglement prong.
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that would divide government along religious lines.3 3 As a result of its
failure to pass all three prongs of the Lemon test, the statute was declared
unconstitutional.
3 4
Despite criticism from commentators3 5 and members of the
Court,3 6 the Lemon test remains the yardstick by which state endorse-
ment of religion is measured. Although the Court has repeated its re-
luctance to confine establishment clause analysis to the Lemon test,3 7 it
tends to apply the Lemon test almost exclusively. In only two other cases,
Larson v. Valente3 8 and Marsh v. Chambers,3 9 has the Court employed
other analytical modes. 40 Implicit in the Lemon approach is the assump-
tion that some state conduct that endorses religion will be tolerated.4 '
33. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614, 622-24.
34. Id. at 625. The rule that failure to pass even one prong will lead to invalidation
was followed in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
35. See Cornelius, supra note 2, at 15-19; Redlich, Separation of Church and State: The
Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1094, 1122-26 (1985) (Court's anal-
ysis of establishment clause cases has "not been a model of consistency"); Note, supra note
15, at 1473.
36. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2519 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
38. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). In Larson, the Court invalidated a Minnesota statute which
placed higher registration and reporting requirements on religions that solicit more than
half of total contributions from nonmembers. Because the statute discriminated among
religions, the Court required the statute to pass a strict scrutiny test, requiring the state to
prove that the statute was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, a bur-
den which could not be overcome. Even so, the Court also applied the Lemon test, holding
that the statute failed to satisfy the entanglement prong. Id. at 254-55.
39. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Marsh, the Court upheld the use of chaplains paid by state
legislatures without applying the Lemon test. The Court found that use of paid chaplains
could not be unconstitutional because the First Congress had permitted the practice at the
same time that it promulgated the establishment clause. No explanation was offered for
the Court's failure to employ the Lemon test.
40. Apart from the rationale behind the decisions in Larson and Marsh, Professor Van
Alstyne has identified an alternative to the Lemon test. Arising from the Lynch plurality
opinion, the test has been called the "any more than" test. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the
Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson 's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 770, 783-85. Under this analysis, state endorsement of religion will be tolerated un-
less the degree of intrusion upon the establishment clause is greater than that which has
been declared permissible in the past. Therefore, public display of a creche would not
violate the etablishment clause because it would not advance religion "any more than"
chaplains paid at public expense.
Such reasoning is faulty because it fails to explain how the degree of intrusion occa-
sioned by public display of a creche is comparable to that of chaplains in state legislatures.
Chief Justice Burger admitted that such comparisons are "difficult and elusive to make."
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681. Even if such intrusions could be quantified in an objective way, the
practice of categorically comparing different cases without examining the reasons for their
acceptance is an exercise in legal legerdemain. Such an analysis would prevent a court
from invalidating state action that happened to advance religion less obtrusively than
whatever happened to be the most egregious example of permissible intrusion upon the
establishment clause. It simply makes no sense to divorce a fact pattern from the reasons
for its acceptance. To ignore the unique factors that make a particular act permissible is to
rob a case of its "ingenuity, subtlety, and reasoning." Note, supra note 9, at 511 n.104.
Also, this suggested test lacks any mechanism for limiting the degree of permissible gov-
ernmental endorsement of religion in future cases. As such, it is a door that can swing
open but never shut.
41. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771
(1973) (state action conferring an indirect benefit to religion is permissible).
1987]
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The limits of this assumption were left for future courts to define.
C. Government Display of Religious Symbols
The Tenth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to use the
Lemon test to determine the validity of a public display of religious sym-
bols. In Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp. ,42 the Fraternal Order of Eagles
erected a three by five foot monolith which depicted the Ten Command-
ments, the Star of David, the All Seeing Eye of God, and the Christian
symbol for Christ, which also represents peace. 4 3 The court held that
the monolith did not violate the establishment clause under the Lemon
test. Noting that the Ten Commandments have secular significance as
the antecedent of the modem legal system, and that passersby were free
to ignore the display, 44 the court found that the secular purpose the
monolith was designed to serve outweighed whatever endorsing effect it
might have produced. The monolith, described as a "passive monu-
ment," 4 5 was allowed to stand.
State courts have split over the validity of public display of the
cross. 4 6 State court decisions in this area have been characterized as
demonstrating a willingness to accommodate whatever action states
choose to pursue. 47 The Supreme Court offered some insight into the
limits of permissible government endorsement of religious symbols in
Stone v. Graham.48 A Kentucky statute required the state to post the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms. In striking down the stat-
ute, the Court added two principles to purpose prong analysis. First,
courts are not required to accept whatever flimsy purpose the state ad-
vances to justify its conduct. If the purpose for acting is self-serving,
then courts are free to disregard it.4 9 Second, courts may infer an intent
to endorse religion from the mere presence of religious symbols within
the display. 50 The Court rejected the rationale applied in Anderson.
Rather than declaring that the purpose for posting the Ten Command-
ments was to recognize its historical basis for the modem legal system,
the Court found that the real purpose for posting the Ten Command-
ments was to induce children to think about and worship God, a pur-
42. 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973).
43. Id. at 30.
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id. at 34.
46. Compare Paul v. Dade County, 202 So.2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (large cross on
county court house lighted during Christmas season upheld), cert. denied, 207 So.2d 690
(Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1041 (1968) with Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d
792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978) (arranging city hall window blinds to light a
ten story cross on Christmas and Easter struck down). For additional cases upholding the
display of a cross, see Eugene Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 558
P.2d 338 (1976) (lighted cross on mountain upheld), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977);
Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla.) (50 foot cross at city fair upheld), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 980 (1972).
47. See L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE AND THE BURGER COURT 128-32 (1984); Devins,
Religious Symbols and the Establishment Clause, 27J. CHURCH & ST. 19, 27-29 (1985).
48. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
49. Id. at 41.
50. Id.; see Note, supra note 9, at 509.
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pose which is prohibited.
5 '
Stone partially answered the questions raised by ACLU v. Rabun
County Chamber of Commerce.52 In Rabun County, the state insisted that the
purpose for erecting the cross was not to endorse religion, but to pro-
mote tourism. The court, however, found that a twenty-six by thirty-five
foot illuminated cross in a Georgia state park lacked a valid secular pur-
pose. 53 The Rabun County court stated that even if it assumed the cross
had a secular purpose, the purpose prong requires more. Government,
the court maintained, may not use religious means to achieve a secular
goal when nonreligious means are available. 5 4 Since tourism could have
been promoted in a way that would not advance religion, the court held
that display of the cross was violative of the establishment clause.
This line of analysis was curiously rejected by the Supreme Court in
Lynch v. Donnelly,55 one of the Court's most recent articulations of the
limits on governmental display of religious symbols. In that case, a pri-
vate group and the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island erected a Christmas
exhibit in a private park. Owned and maintained by the City, the exhibit
included clowns, elephants, teddy bears and Santa Claus, as well as a
nativity scene, or creche. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts,
holding that inclusion of the creche did not violate the establishment
clause.
56
Writing for a plurality of the Court, ChiefJustice Burger stated that,
far from requiring separation of church and state, the establishment
clause "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not mere toleration of
all religions."' 57 Accordingly, religious symbols must be examined with
one eye on the circumstances that surround the display. 58
In applying the Lemon test, the Court determined that the creche
simultaneously served to support religion and to commemorate the his-
torical origins of a secular holiday. Finding that the creche served a
valid secular purpose, the Court did not consider whether the secular
purpose actually outweighed the religious purpose.
59
In measuring the effect of the creche's display, the Court recited
prior cases which held that a benefit to religion which is merely inciden-
tal does not render the practice invalid. Then, in a dramatic departure
from orthodox effect prong analysis, the Court asserted that whatever
endorsing effect may have resulted from display of the creche would be
considered merely incidental unless the action confers a greater benefit
51. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41.
52. 698 F.2d 1098 (11 th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
53. Id. at 1101.
54. Id. at 1111.
55. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). What was curious was that in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459
U.S. 116 (1982), the Court struck down a Massachusetts liquor law, reasoning that the
intended secular objective could be attained by other means. Yet in Lynch, the Court de-
clared such an inquiry to be "irrelevant." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.7.
56. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
57. Id. at 673.
58. Id. at 679-80.
59. Id. at 681.
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to religion than other conduct which has previously passed constitu-
tional scrutiny.60 Under this safe harbor test, the Court found that dis-
play of the creche was less of a state endorsement of religion than the
use of paid chaplains or Sunday Closing laws. Consequently, the creche
was found to have a primary effect that neither advanced nor inhibited
religion.
6 1
In deciding that all three prongs of the Lemon test had been met, the
Lynch majority emphasized that the context of the Christmas shopping
season served to validate inclusion of the creche in the Christmas ex-
hibit. Yet, as Justice Brennan noted in dissent, the very factors that vali-
dated the creche served to constrain its future applicability.
62
In her concurring opinion to the Lynch plurality, Justice O'Connor
outlined a series of refinements to the Lemon test. Where the plurality
would uphold any state action that merely asserts a valid secular pur-
pose, Justice O'Connor would impose the additional requirement that
the motivation for state action be predominantly secular. 63 Justice
O'Connor's analysis of the state's purpose would be measured under a
subjective standard, but would judge the effect of the action under an
objective test that asked whether "the practice under review in fact con-
veys a message of endorsement or disapproval" of religion.64 Under
her approach, state action having the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion would not violate the establishment clause unless it conveyed a
message that status in the political community turns on the question of
religious affiliation. 65 If believers are made to feel like insiders, or
nonbelievers are ostracized, then the action is prohibited. 66 In accord-
ance with her refinements to the Lemon test, Justice O'Connor concluded
that the existence of a legitimate secular purpose, together with a lesser
degree of endorsement than in other cases, produced an effect that did
not advance religion. 67 Therefore, Justice O'Connor agreed that the
60. Id. at 682-83.
61. Id. at 683. The Court also acted to restrict the scope of the entanglement prong.
The district court had found that display of the creche did not present an issue of adminis-
trative entanglement, but decided that the exhibit had fostered political fragmentation
along religious lines. In reversing the district court, the Lynch plurality held that, except in
cases concerning direct financial support of religious schools or institutions, entanglement
based upon political fragmentation should not be an independent ground for invalidating
state action. Id. at 684. Justice O'Connor agreed, stating that in no event should govern-
ment conduct be prohibited solely due to political entanglement. Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). See also Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of
the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980).
62. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan argued that the significance of a particular holiday should not permit the Court to
employ a relaxed application of the L.emon test. Justice Brennan further argued that the
majority's finding of constitutionality is "essentially a narrow result which turns largely
upon the particular holiday context in which the city of Pawtucket's nativity scene ap-
peared." Id. at 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying
text.
65. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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display of the creche in Lynch was permissible.
Undecided by this case was the constitutionality of either the creche
standing alone on public property6 8 or religious symbols that lack secu-
lar significance. 6 9 The holding of Lynch left open the question of the
validity of a cross on a county seal.
68. Courts have split over the validity of a creche on public property when unaccom-
panied by secular symbols. Cases holding that a creche standing alone violates the estab-
lishment clause include ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 588 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (publicly owned creche on lawn of city hall), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir. 1986) and
Burelle v. City of Nashua, 599 F. Supp. 792 (D.N.H. 1984) (privately owned creche on
grounds of city hall). Holding such a display not to violate the establishment clause is
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984) (privately owned creche in public park),
aff'dby an equally divided court sub. nom. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985).
In Conrad v. City and County of Denver, No. 84SA313 (Colo. Sept. 8, 1986) (en
banc), the Colorado Supreme Court examined article II, section 4 of the Colorado Consti-
tution to decide the validity of a publicly owned creche surrounded by Santa, his reindeer
and elves in a colorful lighting display on the steps of the city hall during the Christmas
season. Article II, section 4, known as the preference clause, provides in part that no
religious denomination or mode of worship may be given any preference by law. The
complaint alleged that the display demonstrated a preference by the City for the Christian
religion. Because of this alleged preference, the complaint demanded that the City's con-
duct pass the strict scrutiny test set forth in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
The court declined to apply a strict scrutiny test, but agreed to examine the creche
under the Lemon test. Conrad v. City and County of Denver, No. 843A313, slip op. at 24
(Colo. Sept. 8, 1986) (Kirschbaum, J., concurring). In holding that the display of the
creche met all three prongs of the Lemon test, the court found that the purpose of the
creche's display was "to promote a feeling of good will, to depict what is commonly
thought to be the historical origins of a national holiday, and to contribute to Denver's
reputation as the city of lights." Id. at 15. The court adopted the rationale of the Lynch
plurality, deciding that in the context of the secular display, the creche did not advance
religion any more than other examples that had been upheld in the past. Id. at 16. Finally,
although it acknowledged that there was evidence of political divisiveness, the court fol-
lowed the Lynch holding that, in the absence of evidence of direct subsidy to religious
institutions, such an inquiry is irrelevant. Id. at 18. Therefore, display of the creche was
found to be constitutional.
These cases show that lower courts have generally interpreted Lynch to protect only
those creches that include secular symbols as part of the display. This serves to confirm
the cynical observation that Lynch created nothing more than a "plastic reindeer" rule.
Fin. Times, Dec. 24, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
69. A number of miscellaneous cases of display of religious symbols and messages
have been found to fail the Lemon test. See Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924
(3d Cir. 1980) (thirty-six foot cross on stage erected for Pope violates all three prongs),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980) (prayer
printed on state road maps violates purpose prong), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Libin
v. Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393 (D. Conn. 1985) (three-by- five foot lighted cross
on wall of volunteer fire department violates effect prong); ACLU v. City of St. Charles,
622 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. II1. 1985) (eighteen foot illuminated cross as part of privately
owned display on public property violates effect prong), aff'd, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.
1986); Greater Houston Chapter of ACLU v. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1984)
(three crosses and Star of David in public park violates all three prongs), appeal dismissed,
755 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1985); Goldstein v. Fire Dep't, 559 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
("Keep Christ in Christmas" sign on fire house violates purpose prong). Yet in Fausto v.
Diamond, 589 F. Supp. 451 (D.R.I. 1984), a public display of a memorial to unborn chil-
dren who had perished as a result of abortions was upheld, even though it included a
drawing of a mother and child that could be construed as a depiction of the Blessed Virgin
Mary and the baby Jesus.
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III. FRIEDAV . BOARD OF COUVT" COMMISSIOA'ERS
A. Facts
The Bernalillo County seal is displayed as a circle with an outer
edge which frames the words "BERNALILLO COUNTY" and "STATE
OF NEW MEXICO" in gold. Within an inner circle directly overhead is
the motto "CON ESTA VENCEMOS" in gold against a blue sky. 70 Be-
neath that is a gold Latin 7 ' cross that occupies about half of the diame-
ter of the inner circle. The cross is trimmed in black, highlighted by
white edging and golden rays emanating from its center. Four dark blue
mountains occupy the middle ground, while the lower region is dark
green and contains eight white sheep.
Although no record remains to explain either the origin or the leg-
islative intent of the seal, it appeared on county documents as early as
1925. Since 1973, the display of the seal has been expanded to include
not only official stationery and documents, but also county motor vehi-
70. Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1985) (en
bane), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2890 (1986). In English the motto "Con Esta Vencemos"
means "With This We Conquer." Id.
71. A Latin cross has a horizontal beam which intersects the vertical beam above its
midpoint. The Bernalillo County cross is a "botonce" cross, which refers to the three
buttons at each end. For a psychological perspective of the cross, see C. JUNG, MAN AND
Ins SYMBOi.s 243-45 (1964) (elevation of horizontal beam symbolic of mankind's elevated
aspirations).
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cles and shoulder patches for the uniforms of officers of the sheriff's
department.
72
Al Friedman, an atheist and "ethnic Jew," was a social worker resid-
ing in Bernalillo County. He brought a declaratory judgment action
against the Board of County Commissioners of Bemalillo County, seek-
ing to enjoin the Board from displaying the county seal. 73 The com-
plaint alleged that the seal violated the establishment clause.
74
Specifically, Friedman contended that the county seal's prominent dis-
play of a large Latin cross, in conjunction with the motto "Con Esta
Vencemos," was an endorsement of the Christian religion that was
"anathematical" to him and other non-Christians. Friedman also per-
ceived the eight sheep depicted in the seal as symbolic of the flock of
Jesus, which had a further inhibiting effect upon him.
75
The district court disagreed with Mr. Friedman's allegations. Em-
phasizing the historical importance of Catholicism in the region, the
court held that although the cross and motto have religious significance,
the seal was not violative of the establishment clause. 76 The district
court viewed the seal as a predominantly historical symbol and declined
to require its removal. 77 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, a three-judge panel affirmed the judgment of the district court
over a strong dissent by Judge Logan. 78 However, on rehearing en
banc, the Tenth Circuit vacated the panel decision in a five to two
vote, 79 holding that the effect of the seal impermissibly endorsed reli-
gion. The County was ordered to cover the seal. The County petitioned
the United States Supreme Court to decide the case, but that petition
was denied.80
B. Panel Decision
In affirming the decision of the district court that the seal did not
72. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 779.
73. Mr. Friedman brought the action with Herald Johnson, but Mr. Johnson failed to
appear at the hearing and did not participate in the appeal. Johnson v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 528 F. Supp. 919,921 (D.N.M. 1981), rev'd, 781 F.2d 777 (1985), cert. denied, 106
S.Ct. 2890 (1986).
74. The complaint also alleged that the seal violated the free exercise clause as well as
article II, section II of the New Mexico Constitution. Having found that the seal violated
the establishment clause, the Tenth Circuit found no need to examine the other charges.
Friedman, 781 F.2d at 780.
75. Johnson, 528 F. Supp. at 921. The sheep/shepherd metaphor appears in both the
Old and New Testaments. See, e.g., Psalms 23:1 ("The Lord is my shepherd"); Matthew
25:32 (Before the Son of man "shall be gathered all nations: and he shall separate them
one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats.").
76. Johnson, 528 F. Supp. at 924.
77. Id. at 925.
78. Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, No. 82-1064 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1984),
vacated, 781 F.2d 777 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2890 (1986).
79. Judge Logan accomplished the herculean task of not only convincing Judges Mc-
Kay, Seymour and Moore to vacate the panel decision, but also persuading Chief Judge
Holloway to reverse himself and overrule without comment the very opinion he wrote for
the panel majority. Dissenting were Judges McWilliams and Barrett. Friedman, 781 F.2d
777.
80. 106 S.Ct. 2890 (1986). See Rocky Mtn. News, June 10, 1986, at 24, col. 5.
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violate the establishment clause, the Tenth Circuit panel applied the fa-
miliar Lemon test.8 ' First, the panel concluded that the district court did
not err when it found that the seal served a secular purpose. The inclu-
sion of the motto with the cross was found to be a "most troubling prob-
lem,"8 2 but was not enough to outweigh the secular purpose of
memorializing the cultural history of New Mexico.8 3 Second, the panel
agreed with the district court that the seal did not have a primary effect
of advancing religion. In doing so, the panel conceded that to some
extent the seal did promote religion. But, given the history of Christian
involvement in the area as well as the ordinary uses that the County
made of the seal, the panel found that whatever benefit the seal may
have conferred upon religion was insufficient to render it an official en-
dorsement of religion.8 4 Finally, the panel concluded that the seal did
not excessively entangle government and religion, either through ad-
ministrative entanglement or through political fragmentation along reli-
gious lines.8 5 Therefore, the seal passed constitutional muster.
Judge Logan strenuously dissented. His primary objection was that
the visual impact of the cross was so overpowering that it rendered the
seal an obvious endorsement of religion. 8 6 Acknowledging that a fair
analysis of the seal's validity requires consideration of the historical con-
tributions of Christianity to the area, Judge Logan nevertheless believed
the display of the cross was too prominent to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. In a frank aside, Judge Logan admitted that, like pornography,
an establishment clause violation is hard to define, but he knew it when
he saw it, and he saw it here.
8 7
C. The Tenth Circuit's En Banc Opinion
1. Majority Opinion
In overruling both the district court and the three-judge panel, the
Friedman majority adopted much ofJudge Logan's analysis from his dis-
senting opinion to the panel decision. In applying the Lemon test, the
court concluded that the seal's primary effect was to advance religion.
88
Although it did not overrule the district court's finding that the seal
served a secular purpose, the court, in a footnote, admonished the lower
court for accepting the County's justifications for the seal without re-
quiring corroborating documentation8 9 The court reasoned that the
judiciary must ensure that government acts for the reasons it purports.
81. Friedman, No. 82-1064, slip op. at 6. The majority opinion of the unpublished
panel decision appears as an appendix to the en banc decision.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id. at 4 (Logan, J., dissenting). Judge Logan also felt that placing the seal on
police cars and uniforms violated the entanglement prong. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 3 (Logan, J., dissenting) (paraphrasingJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
88. 781 F.2d at 780-82.
89. Id. at 780 n.3.
[Vol. 64:1
HIDING BEHIND THE WALL
Likewise, the court found the district court's reasoning regarding entan-
glement to be overly accommodating toward government because even
the minimal cost involved in displaying the seal represents some
entanglement. 90
The court adopted Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch
as the appropriate standard for measuring impermissible state endorse-
ment of religion. 9 1 Under this standard, state action that the average
observer perceives as an endorsement of religion is disallowed. The
court suggested that state action is similarly prohibited if the average
viewer perceives the action as having the appearance of promoting the
religion the symbol represents. 9 2 In measuring reactions to the seal, the
court considered a rabbi's testimony, as well as the hypothetical re-
sponse of a Lebanese Moslem, a Northern Irish Protestant, and a Native
American.93 At the same time, the court discounted the responses that
certain Christian and lay witnesses had to the seal, due to their familiar-
ity with and acceptance of the cross. 94 The court concluded that the seal
conveys to the average citizen the impression that the County impermis-
sibly endorsed Christianity.9 5
The court next decided that the Lynch holding did not require a
finding that the use of the seal is valid. A creche is not a cross. As the
court noted, the creche in Lynch was only displayed during the Christmas
season, while the Bernalillo County seal is seen daily. The creche was
displayed in a commercial setting, while the cross is not. The creche was
not more prominently displayed than the other secular components in
the display, while the cross is the focus of the seal. The Friedman court
held that the additions of the motto and the blaze of light served to
elevate the cross into a position of prominence that the Lynch holding
could not protect.96
The court found that placing the seal on the uniforms and vehicles
of police officers served to exacerbate the seal's endorsing effect. Rea-
soning that the average citizen could assume that any officer who wore
such an emblem must be a Christian, the court suggested that a non-
Christian might presume that such sheriffs could not treat unbelievers
fairly, and might even try to avoid traffic tickets by posing as a Chris-
tian.9 7 The effect of these assumptions, the court suggested, would be
to pressure citizens to act as Christians. Such government coercion
would be intolerable.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 781.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 782.
95. Id.
96. Id. The court stated in a footnote that the cross stands "approximately one foot
high" on the seal that appears on the door of county motor vehicles. Id. at 779 n.1. Close
scrutiny of the photograph contained in Appendix A of Friedman, however, reveals that the
cross is smaller than the side mirror assembly, which is about seven inches tall. Id. at 784
(author's estimate).
97. Id. at 782.
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Rather than holding that the display of the seal was a per se violation
of the establishment clause, the court, through dictum, stated that a
message of government endorsement might not be perceived if the dis-
play of the seal was confined to an embossed notary seal or one-color
drawing on official paper work.9 8 Since the effect of the seal, as de-
picted, constituted an establishment clause violation, the court ordered
its removal.
2. Dissenting Opinions
Two judges voted to uphold the validity of the seal, fully adopting
Chief Judge Holloway's panel decision.9 9 Writing separately, Judge
Barrett found not only that the majority failed to apply the Lemon test in
a common sense fashion, but also that the circumstances creating a vali-
dating context for the Lynch exhibit were present in the seal. 10 0 Like the
creche, the cross served a legitimate secular purpose. Therefore, Judge
Barrett maintained, the reasoning that upheld the validity of the display
of the Lynch creche must protect the Bernalillo County cross.
Judge Barrett then suggested that the County's inclusion of the
cross in its seal did not advance religion as much as other government-
sponsored conduct that had nevertheless been held to be tolerable. Ex-
amples such as prayers at public school graduations and the bailiff's cry
of "God Save the United States and This Honorable court" served to
illustrate this point.' 0 ' Judge Barrett declared that by ignoring such ex-
amples, the majority reached an anomalous result.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Friedman court reached the correct result, but employed faulty
reasoning in doing so. Its analysis echoes the words of the Lemon test
without considering what those words mean. As a result, the appropri-
ate standard for measuring public display of religious symbols remains
uncertain.
A. Secular Purpose
In declining to overrule the district court holding that the seal
served a valid secular purpose, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cor-
rectly acknowledges that religious symbols can be displayed in public
when an historical or cultural justification exists.' 0 2 Given the number
of instances in which government has attempted to cloak religious moti-
vation in secular garb,' 0 3 the court's warning to remain alert for sham
98. Id. at 781.
99. Judge McWilliams adopted ChiefJudge Holloway's panel decision in full without
further comment. Id. at 784 (McWilliams,J., dissenting). Judge Barrett also adopted Chief
Judge Holloway's panel decision in full, but expressed additional views. Id. (Barrett, J.,
dissenting).
100. Id. at 785 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 785-86 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
102. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-81 (1984); see Devins, supra note 47, at 29.
103. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (actual purpose of
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purposes may be timely, but it is unnecessary in this case. The seal has
been used almost from the time of New Mexico's statehood.10 4 The ele-
ments of the seal arguably represent the most distinctive features of Ber-
nalillo County, and no evidence exists to indicate that the seal's artist
was motivated by an intent to promote religion at the County's expense.
B. Primary Effect
1. Measured by an Objective Standard
Friedman states, but fails to apply, the proper standard for measur-
ing the effect of governmental display of religious symbols. In so doing,
the court uses evidence improperly to justify its conclusion. The court
relies on Justice O'Connor's Lynch concurrence in stating that the effect
of the seal is to be measured by considering the perceptions of the aver-
age citizen.1 0 5 Therefore, it was not inappropriate for the court to dis-
count the testimony of the Christian witnesses, because their religious
convictions could predispose them to accept what a detached observer
would reject. But, by not similarly discounting the rabbi's testimony,
the Friedman court is guilty of tipping the scales against the seal. In addi-
tion, it is correspondingly disingenuous for the court to consider the
hypothetical reactions of Lebanese Moslems, Northern Irish Protestants,
and Native American Indians as indicative of an objective response to
the presence of the cross in the seal. It hardly bears stating that those
who wish to learn what the average person thinks should not base their
answer on the response of someone with an ax to grind. The establish-
ment clause does not define the limits of permissible state conduct by
measuring the sensibilities of its most sensitive or fastidious citizens.
10 6
2. Symbolic Benefit to Religion
Friedman advances the proposition that "[a]n implicit symbolic ben-
efit is enough" to invalidate state endorsement of religion. 10 7 An im-
plicit symbolic benefit is usually derived from the appearance that
government, by displaying a particular religious symbol, has placed its
stamp of approval on the tenets of that religion. 10 8 Thus, the court
finds that placing the seal on police cars and uniforms has the impermis-
sible effect of placing the "power, prestige and financial support" of
posting Ten Commandments was to teach children to worship God); Gilfillan v. City of
Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980) (alleged purpose in erecting stage and thirty-six
foot cross for Pope of creating a "public relations bonanza" was first asserted on appeal),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
104. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 779.
105. Id. at 781.
106. Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and County of
Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1981).
107. 781 F.2d at 781.
108. Id. at 782; see, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (statute giving
church power to veto liquor license applications gives church the appearance of govern-
mental authority); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (placing Ten Com-
mandments in grade school classrooms gives children the appearance that Christianity is
the "correct" religion).
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government behind the Catholic church.10 9 While such a statement was
true at one time, I10 it fails to recognize the Supreme Court's recent re-
treat from that position. I I I As a result of its reliance upon a rationale
that has been abandoned, Friedman seriously misstates the standard for
measuring the effect of governmental display of religious symbols.
In support of its position, Friedman purports to adopt Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch as the appropriate standard for
measuring establishment clause violations.12 Through clever editing,
the court twists the meaning ofJustice O'Connor's statement to suit its
own ends. The court stated that " '[t]he effect prong asks whether, irre-
spective of government's actual purpose, the practice . . . conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval.' "113 What Justice O'Connor
actually wrote was that "[tihe effect prong asks whether, irrespective of
government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval."' "14 The reinsertion of the
phrase "under review in fact" serves to rebut the proposition that a
mere symbolic benefit to religion is sufficient to result in an establish-
ment clause violation. The Lynch plurality holds that the existence of de
minimis endorsement of religion is not enough to find state action uncon-
stitutional.1 5 The Lynch plurality actually assumed that display of the
creche advanced religion, yet it did not find that the display was uncon-
stitutional.1 6 For these reasons, the Friedman court's reliance on its ver-
sion of justice O'Connor's statement is misplaced.
As a second basis for finding that a symbolic benefit to religion will
cause a public display of religious symbols to be held invalid, Friedman
relies upon the rationale of two cases, Larkin v. Grendel's Den 117 and Bell
109. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 782 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 221 (1963)).
110. See supra note 108; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 40 at 771 (current attitude of the
Court is to accommodate symbiosis between church and state).
11. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2496 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(outlining way to draft silent prayer st.tute that would not violate establishment clause);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding display of creche); Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding use of chaplains in state legislatures). See alo Note, supra
note 9, at 507-09 (bemoaning magnitude of Court's retreat since Stone and Larkin).
112. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 781.
113. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
114. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Friedman's
notable omission of the phrase "under review in fact" was one ground for reversal that the
County raised in its petition to the Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit at 15, Friedman v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2890 (1986).
115. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683 (plurality) ("[O]ur precedents plainly contemplate that on
occasion some advancement of religion will result from governmental action."); see also
Note, Does the Wall Still Stand?: Separation of Church and State in the United States, 37 BAYLOR L.
REV. 755, 769 (1985); cf. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he
effect prong of the Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require invalidation of a gov-
ernment practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or
inhibition of religion."). Justice O'Connor remains faithful to toleration of de minimis en-
dorsement of religion. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2497 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
116. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
117. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
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v. Little Axe Independent School District. 118 It is important to note, however,
that Lynch considered and rejected the contention that display of the
creche created the same sort of symbolic benefit to religion that was
present in either Larkin 1 19 or McCollum v. Board of Education,120 a case
almost identical to Little Axe. 12 1 Lynch rejects what Friedman adopts. By
failing to explain why the Lynch rationale should be abandoned, the find-
ing of the Friedman court that the mere presence of a symbolic benefit to
religion invalidates state action is clearly erroneous.
As indicated by numerous instances of government conduct that
have passed constitutional muster, an implicit symbolic benefit to reli-
gion is not enough to prohibit state action. If the mere appearance of
government endorsement of religion was sufficient to show an establish-
ment clause violation, then "In God We Trust" could never be printed
on coins and currency, 122 paid chaplains would be barred from leading
prayers in state legislatures,t 23 and bailiffs could never announce "God
save the United States and this Honorable Court."' 124 Indeed, such a
standard would not only undermine the Friedman observation that a
black-and-white drawing of the seal could be permissible, but would also
emasculate the court's statement that " '[t]he Government may depict
objects with spiritual content, but it may not promote or give its stamp
of approval to such spiritual content.' "125
3. Not "How Often" but "How Prominently"
In distinguishing the Friedman cross from the Lynch creche, the court
failed to emphasize the factor that merits the most attention. That the
creche is displayed only once a year, while the seal is seen daily, is not an
appropriate distinction to justify upholding one while invalidating the
other. 12 6 Both symbols derive their secular significance from the history
of the events they commemorate. Certainly, the effect of state endorse-
118. 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985).
119. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
120. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
121. In McCollum, a "released time" program was found to violate the establishment
clause. Public school children who volunteered to participate in the program were allowed
to miss class in order to attend religious instruction while public school children who did
not participate in the program were required to undertake their secular studies elsewhere
in the building. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 209. In Little Axe, the Tenth Circuit found that
holding voluntary weekly religious meetings before classes in a public grade school failed
all three prongs of the Lemon test. Little Axe, 766 F.2d at 1404-06. The court held that
permitting meetings of the Son Shine Club on school grounds conveys a symbolic infer-
ence of endorsement of religion to an "impressionable student." In both cases the courts
voiced the concern that children would receive the mistaken impression that the religion
being taught was somehow the "correct" one by virtue of being taught at school.
122. Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970); O'Hair v. Blumenthal, 462
F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 930 (1979).
123. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
124. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
125. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 781 (quoting Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir.
1970)).
126. But see L. PFEFFER, supra note 47, at 129 (arguing that the seasonal nature of dis-
play is a valid distinguishing factor).
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ment of religion increases with the frequency of display of the religious
symbol, but even a daily religious message can be tolerated in the
proper context. Coins contain a religious message that is seen every day
without violating the establishment clause. 127 Military cemeteries con-
tain thousands of cross-shaped grave markers, but their presence has
never been challenged. 128 The court noted in dictum that a one-color
depiction or embossed impression of the Bernalillo County seal could
pass constitutional muster. 129 These examples make it clear that gov-
ernment could display a cross on a county seal that would be seen every
day without impermissibly endorsing religion.
In cases of governmental display of religious symbols, the more im-
portant factor to consider is not how often the religious symbol is
shown, but whether the religious symbol is displayed more prominently
than the secular components that surround it. The degree of promi-
nence of government display of religious symbols can be measured in
three ways: the size of the religious symbol in relation to the secular
components; whether the focus of the display is on the religious symbol;
and whether the secular components of the display serve to return the
observer's eye to the religious symbol, thereby reinforcing the imper-
missible endorsing effect. The efficacy of this test can be shown through
its application to the display of the motto "In God We Trust" on the
American quarter. The size of the motto's type is smaller than that of
either the year of mint or the word "Liberty". The center of the coin is
occupied by Washington's silhouette, while the motto is placed off to the
lower left. Finally, none of the secular components return the ob-
server's attention to the religious message of the motto. Consequently,
the motto would not impermissibly endorse religion.
Applying the same test to the Bernalillo County seal produces a dif-
ferent result. The cross is the largest component of the seal. The center
of the seal is occupied by the cross. Rays of light emanate from its
center to spotlight the cross. Black-and-white edging creates a stark
color contrast between the cross and the blue sky background. These
factors bolster the impression that the cross is the focus of the seal. Fi-
nally, two of the seal's secular components create ambiguities that serve
to return attention to the seal. First, it is not only possible but likely that
the word "This" in the Spanish motto "With This We Conquer" refers
to the cross as the instrumentality of spiritual victory, although other
constructions are conceivable.13 0 In any event, this ambiguity creates a
question that forces a curious observer to search the seal for an answer.
This would necessarily return attention to the cross. Second, even as-
suming that the eight sheep in the seal were included for the sole pur-
127. See supra note 122.
128. But see Birdine v. Moreland, 579 F.Supp. 412, 417 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (state may erect
Latin cross or Star of David in public cemetary without violating the establishment clause).
129. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 781.
130. Expert testimony at trial indicated that "This" could refer not to "the cross" but
to "the land," "the totality," "the sum," or "the history" of Bernalillo County. Record at
18-20.
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pose of representing Bernalillo County's sheep-raising heritage, it is not
surprising that someone might misconstrue the intended message by
thinking that the sheep were meant to refer to the flock of Christ. The
presence of the cross would then inadvertently further that misconcep-
tion. As with the Spanish motto, the cross would be the key to answer-
ing the question raised by the ambiguity of the sheep. Under all three
parts of the test, the cross would be considered more prominently dis-
played than the surrounding secular components, which would consti-
tute an impermissible endorsement of religion.
Although Friedman mentions these objective measures of prominent
display of the cross as factors for invalidating the seal, 13 1 the court de-
clines to end its inquiry there. In addition, the court holds that the same
result can be explained by the presence of either an implicit symbolic
benefit to religion or the mere appearance of government endorsement
of religion.' 3 2 To the extent that Friedman relies upon these additional
rationalizations, the decision defies prior case holdings, its own policy
considerations, and common sense.' 3 3 However, the holding of Fried-
man can be justified by its implicit recognition that the Bernalillo County
cross is displayed in a manner that would objectively be perceived as
being too prominent. Therefore, the court is on safe legal ground in
concluding that the seal violates the establishment clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The result in Friedman can be defended on the basis of the degree of
prominence of the display of the cross in the seal. The cross is simply
too large and displayed too prominently. But by holding that govern-
mental display of religious symbols can be banned either through the
mere appearance of a symbolic benefit to religion or through specula-
tion over hypothetical reactions of aggrieved minorities, Friedman obfus-
cates the very guidelines it adopts. As the Tenth Circuit Court once
observed, "[t]he wholesome neutrality guaranteed by the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses does not dictate obliteration of all our reli-
gious traditions."' 134 Yet the broad language that Friedman embraces
could be employed in future cases to require removal of all religious
symbols from public display, which is surely not the result the court
intended. 1
3 5
131. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 782.
132. Id. at 781.
133. See supra notes 107-121 and accompanying text.
134. Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 34 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S.
879 (1973). See also Commentary, Secularism in the Law: The Religion of Secular Humanism, 8
OHIo N.U.L. REv. 329, 339 (1981) (establishment clause was never intended to extirpate
religion from public life).
135. If the court had intended that all seals displaying religious symbols violated the
establishment clause, then it would not have gone out of its way to show how Bernalillo
County could have permissibly included a cross in its seal. Two cases of potential litiga-
tion illustrate the problem that the Friedman court's rationale presents. The township seal
of Zion, Illinois, contains a Latin cross that occupies about one-third of the seal. The
shield-shaped emblem also shows the word "ZION," a dove holding an olive branch, a
crown, and scepter. Telephone interview with Howard Everline, Mayor of Zion, Illinois
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Friedman may be another example of newly-confirmed Chief Justice
Rehnquist's statement that silly cases make bad law.' 3 6 That the Tenth
Circuit would be disenchanted with Supreme Court pronouncements on
the establishment clause is understandable, but that does not excuse the
Friedman court from its responsibility to reconcile the result of the case
with the tests it announces. Friedman does serve as a signal that the
Tenth Circuit has abandoned the accommodationist stance it assumed in
Anderson, and that in the future, it will require the government to show
stricter adherence to the principle of religious neutrality. Whether the
guidelines announced by the Friedman decision will be warmly received
by courts in the rest of the country remains to be seen.
EdwardJ. Posselius III*
(July 28, 1986). The seal was designed by the founder of the Christian Catholic church,
who also founded the town. Both the church and the town display the seal. The town seal
appears not only on paperwork, police cars and the town water tower, but also on street
signs and the registration sticker that each automobile is required to display. Telephone
interview with Robert Sherman, local director of the American Atheists Association in Buf-
falo Grove, Illinois (July 31, 1986).
The city seal of Redlands, California, also contains a Latin cross. The multicolored
seal is divided into four quadrants, representing industry, education, agriculture, and reli-
gion. The cross hovers above a church spire in the lower right quadrant. At least ten
elements in the seal are unrelated to the cross, which is smaller than many of its secular
components. Use of the seal is confined to official documents, city limits signs, and busi-
ness cards. Redlands Daily Facts, April 30, 1986 at 1, col. 3; telephone interview with
Daniel Rodriguez, Community Services Administrator in Redlands, California (July 28,
1986).
If Friedman is interpreted as the court intended, then the Zion seal would be struck
down, while the Redlands seal would be upheld. But if Friedman is interpreted broadly,
then both seals would be held invalid.
136. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 128 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
* The author would like to thank Eric Twelker and Jude Biggs for their assistance,
especially for providing information regarding pending litigation of similar seals.
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